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and Challenges
Abstract. This article examines the development and particular nature of the rule of law in the European Union 
against the background of the wider legal and political theoretical debate on the principle. It hence analyses the 
case law of the Court of Justice of the EU and the Treaty revisions on the rule of law. It argues that the principle 
has developed greatly since the fi rst mention of it in the case law of the Court and contends that the principle has a 
particular focus in the EU on judicial protection in light of human rights. Nonetheless it is hard to apply the 
dichotomies running through the debates in legal and political theory to the development of the principle in the 
EU; an idiosyncratic mix of features seems to emerge. Moreover, this article also takes the case study of the 
external dimension of migration control to assess the current challenges to the rule of law in the EU. It thereby 
uncovers ways of working in the EU that are hard to reconcile with the rule of law requirements.
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Introduction
The rule of law seems a self-evident value for academics and policy-makers and has been 
almost unanimously promoted in the post Cold War world. It is a constitutional cornerstone 
of the EU; the Treaties refer to it multiple times as a foundational value. It seems nonetheless 
that this cornerstone is becoming more porous: it suffers from a lack of conceptualisation 
and is under pressure in some EU policies.
This article puts the development of the rule of law in the EU in the wider scholarly 
perspective of the legal and political philosophy debates on the principle. What kind of rule 
of law is the EU actually adhering to or promoting? Firstly, this article argues that although 
indeed the EU seems to adhere to a “thick” or “substantive” notion of the principle, it seems 
nevertheless primarily focused on rather formal aspects, such as on judicial review, albeit in 
light of fundamental rights protection. Secondly, this article argues that, contrary to what 
may be conventional wisdom, compliance with the rule of law is at risk in some EU policy 
sectors due to the proliferation of new forms of governance. 
The structure of this article is hence as follows. Section I briefl y sets out the main 
conceptual dichotomies running through the debate on the rule of law in legal and political 
philosophy. This presents the different notions and discourses on the principle as 
background. It thereby informs the subsequent analysis of the principle in the EU. The 
development of the principle from it being fi rst invoked by the CJEU in its landmark Les 
Verts case law (1986) to its current constitutional dominance is described in Section II. This 
analysis uncovers idiosyncratic features of the principle in EU law. The fi rst two sections 
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also aim to give a brief overview, or summary, of the main lines of thinking on the rule of 
law in the EU. Finally, Section III takes the case study of the external dimension of EU 
migration control to assess how the rule of law fares in contemporary EU policy making. 
The assessment reveals that despite uplifting rhetoric on the principle its full potential is not 
yet attained in this EU policy area.   
1. Theoretical and Conceptual Discussions on the Rule of Law
The rule of law arguably suffers from a lack of clear conceptualisation. Many scholars have 
already suggested that as a concept it is perhaps so elusive that this made it in fact so 
universally and globally acceptable.1 Craig even issues a “health warning” to those 
venturing into the rule of law debate; 2 there are so many diverging conceptions and 
academic discussions that the concept is held to become “elusive”3, “essentially contested”4 
and perhaps even “less clear today than ever before”.5 This may be overstating it a bit. In 
the Union’s “Holy Trinity” of “democracy, human rights and the rule of law”, “human 
rights” have the Charter and international treaties to give them substance and “democracy” 
has its ultimate conceptual core in majority-rule through free and fair elections.6 Articulating 
what “the rule of law” means is however rare, also on the national level.7 In the EU there is 
no codifi ed agreement on what the principle should mean, apparently not because it is so 
fi ercely publicly contested but exactly because it is not.8 This evokes the slightly 
disconcerting question: if indeed there is no shared notion within the Union, then what is it 
actually claiming to “safeguard”, “consolidate” or “support”? And if it is indeed true that 
the principle is so elusive for those actors, can it credibly constrain policies? After all, 
constraining–and not “guiding”–State power is the classic objective of the rule of law as 
traditionally perceived in the liberal-democratic nation-state.9
The substance, requirements and characteristics of the rule of law are also the object of 
much contention within political and legal theory. This section offers neither an extensive 
nor a conclusive description of what the rule of law means and how it evolved over time. 
Instead, to illustrate that it is “an essentially contested concept”, this section aims to give 
some background to the main disputes that exist over its meaning. The rationale for delving 
1 Tamanaha, B. Z.: On the rule of law–history, politics, theory. Cambridge, 2004. 3.
2 Craig, P.: The Rule of Law. Appendix 5 in House of Lords Select Committee on the 
Constitution, Relations between the executive, the judiciary and Parliament, HL Paper. 2006–
2007. 97.
3 Tamanaha: op. cit. 3.
4 Waldron, J.: Is the rule of law an essentially contested concept (in Florida)? Law and 
Philosophy, 21 (2002) 2, 148.
5 Fallon Jr., R.: The “Rule of Law” as a Concept in Constitutional Discourse. Columbia Law 
Review, 97 (1997)1, 1.
6 Of course, democracy is not merely majority-rule; an appropriate democracy needs to include 
minority rights and constitutional limitations on law-making and (constitutional) change. 
7 Pech, L.: The Rule of Law as a constitutional principle of the European Union. Jean Monnet 
Working Paper–NYU School of Law, 4 (2009), 42–43.
8 Pech, L.: Rule of Law as a guiding principle of the European Union’s external action. CLEER 
Working Papers, 3 (2012) 22. See also Chesterman, S.: An International Rule of Law? American 
Journal of Comparative Law, 56 (2008), 332.
9 Tamanaha: op. cit. 114–119.
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into this conceptual debate is that the development of the rule of law in the EU could be 
analysed and understood along some of these lines.  
Since its origins in “the classics” and medieval times, the rule of law has expanded 
into a concept fundamental to the liberal-democratic nation-state.10 The main dichotomy 
running through the theoretical debate is that between “thin” or “formal” versus “thick” or 
“substantive” concepts of the rule of law. The thinnest version is the “rule by law” 
conception: merely meaning “the government acts through laws” thereby avoiding “rule by 
men”. To illustrate, some claim that the Chinese regime adheres to this notion.11 To endorse 
that conception of the rule of law would however be a misinterpretation of the liberal 
thought in which the concept evolved; “rule by law” lacks the notion of effective limitations 
on government power. 
Therefore, the dominant thin version of the rule of law in liberal thought understands it 
as “formal legality”.12 According to central legal theorists such as Hayek and Raz, the rule 
of law’s fundamental function would be “guiding the behaviour” of citizens.13 Hence, it 
requires fi rst of all general, prospective, clear and certain laws as the basis of government 
action. Secondly, a set of institutions were deemed necessary by Raz to effectuate the rule 
of law requirements, namely an independent judiciary with open and fair hearings and 
review of administrative and legislative action, and a limitation of security services’ 
discretion, such as the police’s.14 What is important to understand is that this formal legality 
is “substantively empty”; it essentially only imposes procedural requirements. According to 
some, this “value free nature” made it so widely acceptable.15 Possibly, to the shock of 
some, Raz pointed out that indeed slavery and the rule of law as formal legality could be 
perfectly well reconcilable.16
Thick (or substantive) theories bring–to different extents–individual rights into the rule 
of law concept. As Dworkin put it: 
“I shall call the second conception of the rule of law the ‘rights’ conception. It assumes 
that citizens have moral rights and duties with respect to one another, and political rights 
against the state as a whole. (...) It does not distinguish, as the rule book conception does, 
between the rule of law and substantive justice...”.17
Some have voiced their concern over the anti-democratic implications of such a rights-
based rule of law regime and its inherent judicialisation of politics, by taking the German 
Rechtsstaat as example.18 The thickest substantive version of the rule of law also takes 
socio-economic “welfare” rights into the “dynamic concept” of the rule of law.19 
10 For example, Plato already discussed the rule of law: Aristotle, Politics, book 3, part XVI.
11 Tamanaha: op. cit. 3, 92–93. 
12 Summers, R. S.: A Formal Theory of the Rule of Law. 6 Ratio Juris, 1993. 127.
13 Raz, J.: The Rule of Law and its Virtue. In: Raz, J.: The Authority of Law. Oxford, 1979. 214; 
Hayek, F. A.: The Political Idea of the Rule of Law. Cairo, 1955. See also Waldron, J.: The Rule of 
Law in Contemporary Liberal Theory. Ratio Juris, 2 (1989), 84–85.
14 Tamanaha: op. cit. 3, 92–93.
15 Ibid. 94.
16 Raz: op. cit. 221.
17 Dworkin, R.: Political Judges and the Rule of Law. Proceedings of the British Academy, 64 
(1978) 259, 262. 
18 Tamanaha: op. cit. 108.
19 See e.g. International Commission of Jurists: The Rule of Law in A Free Society: A Report of 
the International Congress of Jurists. Geneva, 1959.
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The rule of law fell also prey to the left-right divide in politics. On the left, mostly in 
Marxist philosophy, the rule of law was seen as a concept of the ruling elite to enforce the 
order of property protection and privilege.20 On the right, especially in the US, the rise of 
the welfare state was seen as a considerable threat to the rule of law understood as formal 
legality, with the generality of government action believed to be in jeopardy by the mounting 
unaccountable administrative machinery of the state interfering ever more individually, or 
even arbitrarily, in citizens’ lives.21  
Although it seems that today in (Western) liberal democracies when the rule of law is 
invoked, it comes in the same “package” with democracy and human rights, this need not 
conceptually be the case. In fact, that is problematic: making the rule of law the “mother” 
concept and thus the battleground for clashes over human rights, social values and 
substantive equality comes at the cost of losing clear conceptual boundaries of the principle. 
Recently, theorists have attempted to reconceptualise the rule of law for our times of 
globalisation.22 For obvious reasons this debate is highly relevant when looking at the rule 
of law and the EU, itself being the world’s most successful post-nationalist political 
structure. This reconceptualisation is not straight-forward exactly because the rule of law is 
so inextricably linked to the nation-state. In the global arena many of the essential state-like 
powers are not present. Nonetheless, the rule of law even in its thinnest version could add 
much to the ongoing construction of a rule-based global order with its own institutions, 
including those for review of state and individual action, thereby arguably reducing the 
much described “anarchy” in international relations. However, from the strand of critical 
legal theory others have pointed to the “perversity” of the global rule of law in legitimising 
and “organising irresponsibility” for human rights violations.23
2. Development of the rule of law principle in the EU
This section gives a brief overview of how the rule of law principle came to the constitutional 
forefront in EU law. It traces mostly the case law of the CJEU and the subsequent treaty 
revisions. From this analysis two questions will be answered: 1) To what conceptual notion 
of the rule of law does the EU adhere? 2) What are the dominant elements of the rule of law 
in the EU?
2.1. Development of the rule of law in the Court’s case law
It was not until 1986 that the rule of law principle became explicit in the EU legal order; the 
Court held in the landmark Les Verts case that the Community is “based on the rule of 
law”.24 However, already before that defi ning case, the rule of law was implicitly embedded 
in the constitutional structure of the Community. Especially former Art. 164 TEC (later Art. 
220 TEC), akin to Art. 31 of the ECSC Treaty, indicated the rule of law by stipulating that 
“the Court of Justice shall ensure that in the interpretation and application of this Treaty the 
20 Tamanaha: op. cit. 73–77. 
21 Ibid. 60–72.
22 Zifcak, S.: Globalisation and the Rule of Law. London, 2005.
23 Veitch, S.: Law and irresponsibility–on the legitimation of human suffering. London, 2007.
24 Case 294/83, Les Verts v. Parliament, ECR [1986] 1339, para. 23.
208 LEONHARD DEN HERTOG
law is observed” (emphasis added).25 And although the Court had already referred to these 
Articles in its case law before 1986, the “Community based on the rule of law” formula 
signalled a watershed in the Court’s role in the constitutionalisation of the principle. In this 
formula the Court thus aligned with the French notion of Communauté de droit (French was 
the language of the procedure), or German notion of Rechtsgemeinschaft.26 This notion 
signals indeed the post-nationalist nature of the EU; in contrast to the Rechtsstaat.27
In Les Verts the Court had to decide on whether acts of the European Parliament could 
also be annulled under Art. 173 TEC (now Art. 263 TFEU); something that was not stipulated 
by the Treaty as it limited this to acts of the Council and the Commission. However, the 
Court held that notwithstanding this limited list of institutions under Art. 173 TEC 
“…the European Economic Community is a Community based on the rule of law, 
inasmuch as neither its Member States nor its institutions can avoid a review of the 
question whether the measures adopted by them are in conformity with the basic 
constitutional charter, the Treaty. (...) the Treaty established a complete system of legal 
remedies and procedures designed to permit the Court of Justice to review the legality 
of measures adopted by the institutions. Natural and legal persons are thus protected 
against the application to them of general measures which they cannot contest directly 
before the Court by reason of the special conditions of admissibility laid down in the 
second paragraph of Article 173 of the Treaty. (...) The general scheme of the Treaty is 
make a direct action available against ‘all measures adopted by the institutions ... 
which are intended to have legal effects’ (...) An interpretation of Article 173 of the 
Treaty which excluded measures adopted by the European Parliament from those 
which could be contested would lead to a result contrary both to the spirit of the Treaty 
as expressed in Article 164 and to its system.”28
Hence, the Court introduced the rule of law principle to extend its own jurisdiction and 
the judicial protection offered. In subsequent cases the Court invoked the principle of the 
“Community based on the rule of law” to make similar strides to embolden judicial review 
in the EU.29 For example, in the Sogelma case the Court of First Instance held that an EU 
25 Fernandez Esteban, M. L.: The Rule of Law in the European Constitution. The Hague, 1999. 
104. She argues that “it results from the analysis of the case law of that the Court of Justice uses both 
Art. 164 of the European Community Treaty and the expression Rule of Law indistinctively”. Pech: 
The Rule of Law as a constitutional… op. cit. 15, ftnt. 47, argues that this conclusion is not warranted; 
in fact according to him “it may be more accurate to contend that Art. 220 EC initially offered the 
only written basis from which the Court could convincingly derive the principle of a Community 
based on the rule of law.” I agree with the Pech on this point; the references in Art. 164/220 EC did 
not yet encompass the full breadth of the Rule of Law principle.
26 See for these terms the French and German versions of the judgment.
27 It is interesting that the Court did not use the term “Rechtsstaat”; Pech convincingly argues 
that this, obviously, was not deemed appropriate as the Community was not a State. See for a more 
extensive discussion: Pech: The Rule of Law as a constitutional… op. cit. 11.
28 Les Verts, paras 23–24. 
29 See for example the Zwartveld case in which the Court linked the Les Verts “Community 
based on the rule of law” with the duty of sincere cooperation (then Art. 5 TEC). In casu, the Court 
held that the Commission was under an obligation to provide documents and witnesses to a Dutch 
judicial investigation. Order of the Court in Case C-2/88 Imm., J. J. Zwartveld and Others, ECR 
[1990] I-3365, especially paras 16–17.  
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agency act, in casu of the European Agency for Reconstruction (EAR), could fall under the 
action for annulment, something not foreseen in the Treaty. It argued that “it cannot be 
acceptable, in a Community based on the rule of law, that such acts escape judicial 
review”.30 In the Commission v. EIB case the Court employed a similar argument to 
adjudicate an act of the Management Committee of the European Investment Bank (EIB) 
under the action for annulment.31 This was also not explicitly foreseen in the Treaty text.32 
The Court, with some judicial activism, thus produced dynamic interpretation to fi x 
gaps in judicial review in the EU legal system. In the words of AG Mischio’s Opinion in the 
1990 Busseni case:
“…the Court has on a number of occasions relied on Article 164 of the European 
Community Treaty and the principles deriving from it for the purpose of giving broad 
and coherent interpretation to those provisions of the Treaty which deal with the 
various means of redress, even going so far, when the need arises, as to remedy 
omissions and lacunae within it.”33 
It is interesting to see that the Court thus understood the rule of law mostly in 
procedural terms of judicial remedies: the complete system of remedies needs to be 
effectively in place so that decisions of public authorities can be reviewed independently.34 
This serves of course the effective judicial protection of individuals and other entities (the 
“subjective” function), but also serves to check the legality of measures taken, the latter 
mostly referring to the availability and appropriate choice of legal basis and the hierarchy 
of norms to safeguard the institutional balance in the Union (the “objective” function).35    
However, it seems that the Court has increasingly moved towards linking this 
“procedural” or “formal” rule of law concept (dominated by judicial protection) with 
fundamental rights protection. Of course, some of the elements of the formal rule of law 
concept are human rights themselves (e.g. right to an effective remedy)36 but it seems that 
the rule of law is increasingly seen as connected to general fundamental rights protection at 
large. Some recent case law is illustrative in this respect. The controversial Kadi case is 
perhaps the best example. It concerned a so-called “blacklisted” individual (i.e. under anti-
terrorist policies) whose assets had been frozen; he sought to annul that measure. The Court 
of First Instance had held that no judicial remedy could be offered within the EU legal 
order as the origin of the contested Regulation was a UN Security Council resolution.37 As 
30 Case T-411/06, Sogelma v. EAR, ECR [2008] II-2771, para. 37. However, the Court had 
before also declared an application under former Art. 230 TEC inadmissible because it involved an 
agency: Case C-160/03, Spain v. Eurojust, ECR [2005] I-2077, paras 36–44.  
31 Case C-15/00, Commission v. EIB, ECR [2003] I-7281, para. 75.
32 See former Art. 237(b) TEC.
33 Opinion of AG Mischio in Case 221/88, ECSC v. Acciaierie e Ferriere Busseni spa in 
liquidation, ECR [1990]  I-495, pt. 20. 
34 Pech: The Rule of Law as a constitutional… op. cit. 15. See also Jacobs, F.: The sovereignty 
of law: the European way. Cambridge, 2007. 35.
35 See for the objective v. subjective functions: Esteban: op. cit. 122.
36 See e.g. Art. 47 Charter.
37 Council Regulation (EC) No 467/2001 of 6 March 2001 prohibiting the export of certain 
goods and services to Afghanistan, strengthening the flight ban and extending the freeze of funds and 
other financial resources in respect of the Taliban of Afghanistan, and repealing Regulation (EC) No 
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this thus concerned international law, the Court of First Instance held that it did not have 
jurisdiction to adjudicate the matter.38 The Court of Justice however decided otherwise and 
held that 
“…the obligations imposed by an international agreement cannot have the effect of 
prejudicing the constitutional principles of the EC Treaty, which include the principle 
that all Community acts must respect fundamental rights, that respect constituting a 
condition of their lawfulness which it is for the Court to review in the framework of 
the complete system of legal remedies established by the Treaty. (…) Review by the 
Court of the validity of any Community measure in the light of fundamental rights 
must be considered to be the expression, in a Community based on the rule of law, of a 
constitutional guarantee [our emphasis] stemming from the EC Treaty as an 
autonomous legal system (…).”39
The clear link between the “formal” rule of law requirements and the “substantive” 
protection of fundamental rights is thus clear. Also in the PKK case the Court has held that 
in a “Community based on the rule of law” restrictive measures cannot go unchecked by the 
judiciary.40 In the UPA case, although the eventual outcome was not benefi cial for the 
applicants, the Court linked these elements perhaps most explicitly when it held:
“The European Community is, however, a community based on the rule of law in 
which its institutions are subject to judicial review of the compatibility of their acts 
with the Treaty and with the general principles of law which include fundamental 
rights. Individuals are therefore entitled to effective judicial protection of the rights 
they derive from the Community legal order (…).”41
2.2. The rule of law in EU Treaty making
Quite surprisingly, it was not until the Maastricht Treaty (entry into force in 1993) that the 
rule of law was explicitly mentioned in EU’s constitutional text. However, this was still 
“mostly symbolic”42 and was in no way as strongly worded as the Court had done in Les 
Verts. Instead the preamble to the Treaty indicated that the Member States “confi rmed their 
attachment” to inter alia the rule of law. The Amsterdam Treaty (entry into force in 1999) 
fi nally repeated the Court’s formula and stated thus that the “Union is founded on the 
337/2000 [2001] OJ L67/1; Council Regulation (EC) No 881/2002 of 27 May 2002 imposing certain 
specific restrictive measures directed against certain persons and entities associated with Usama bin 
Laden, the Al-Qaida network and the Taliban, and repealing Council Regulation (EC) No 467/2001 
[2002] OJ L139/9.
38 The Court of First Instance did however hold that it would have jurisdiction if jus cogens 
norms would be in question. See: Case T-315/01, Yassin Abdullah Kadi v. Council of the European 
Union and Commission of the European Communities, ECR [2005] II-03649, para. 226.
39 Joined Cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P, Yassin Abdullah Kadi and Al Barakaat International 
Foundation v. Council of the European Union and Commission of the European Communities, ECR 
[2008] I-03651, paras 285 and 316. Strictly speaking the Court only adjudicated the EU implementing 
measure of the UN resolution.
40 Case C-229/05 P, PKK and KNK v. Council, ECR [2007] I-439, paras 109–110.
41 Case C-50/00 P, UPA, ECR [2002] I-6677, paras 38–39.
42 Pech: The Rule of Law as a constitutional… op. cit. 17.
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principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and 
the rule of law, principles which are common to the Member States” (emphasis added).43 
The Treaty of Lisbon changed the wording from “principles” to “values”, something 
generally seen as insignifi cant in academic analysis.44 Also, over the course of the Treaty 
revisions, the rule of law has been worded in the Treaty as an objective for EU’s foreign 
policy (Arts 21(1) and (2b) TEU), as condition for the accession of new Member States 
(Art. 49 TEU), and as ground for punitive measures against Member States in (or risking) 
“serious and persistent” breach of the rule of law (Art. 7 TEU).45 The Charter also refers to 
the rule of law in its Preamble, but here still as “principle”. From this brief overview, three 
conclusions are appropriate. Firstly, the Treaty text also clearly presents the rule of law 
principle separately but in package with human rights and fundamental freedoms, something 
that, as argued above, increasingly emerges from the Court’s case law as well. Secondly, the 
rule of law is also used as a, what Pech calls, “politico-legal benchmark”: current and 
potential Member States need to act in accordance with the rule of law to enjoy full EU 
membership.46 And thirdly, perhaps more than other constitutions, the Treaties clearly 
present the rule of law as a value to be exported in the Union’s external relations.47
2.3. What Notion and Understanding of the Rule of Law in the EU?
Taking the legal and political theory debate as presented in section 2 and the analysis of 
case law and Treaty revisions in sections 3.1. and 3.2. as background, this section attempts 
to establish what kind of rule of law the EU is adhering to. 
A prima facie analysis of the development of the rule of law in the EU may seem to 
indicate a development from a “thin” or “formal” to a “thick” or “substantive” notion of the 
concept. It seems that when the principle was developed by the Court it focused on 
providing the remedy as such; it served therefore to expand the “complete system of 
remedies” and to assert the independence of the EU legal order. Also, the rule of law 
principle provided the Court with an opening to assert and extend its own jurisdiction. The 
focus then gradually shifted to the rule of law as necessary principle to ensure human rights 
protection.48 However, contrary to what some academics argue, this does not necessarily 
imply that the Union now adheres to a full “substantive” notion of the rule of law as 
discussed in the theoretical debate. That notion implies that the rule of law includes human 
rights and perhaps even democracy; essentially that there is no rule of law if that law is 
unjust or immoral.  
Although it is true that the Union legal order, mostly through the Charter and accession 
to the ECHR, has increasingly acknowledged rule of law principles (e.g. right to effective 
43 Art. 2 TEU. Laurent Pech shows convincingly in his long article that the rule of law is indeed 
a principle “common to the Member States”: Pech: The Rule of Law as a constitutional… op. cit. 
44 See Pech: The Rule of Law as a constitutional… op. cit. 21.
45 Art. 7 TEU has never actually been used against a Member State.
46 Pech: The Rule of Law as a constitutional… op. cit. para. 4.2.1.
47 Larik argues that the EU Treaties are not an odd outlier when it comes to wording such 
explicit principles to guide external relations. Although it is one of the “most explicit” such 
constitutional provisions, he considers them “the vanguard of a global trend”. See Larik, J.: Shaping 
the international order as a Union objective and the dynamic internationalisation of constitutional law. 
CLEER Working Papers, 5 (2011), 36–37. 
48 See for such a conclusion Pech: The Rule of Law as a constitutional… op. cit. 53.
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remedy) as fundamental rights, and it is also true on a conceptual level that the rule of law 
always includes some moral ideals and minimum rights,49 this does not necessarily entail 
that the rule of law concept is now fully “substantive”. Indeed, the rule of law and human 
rights go now hand in hand in the Union legal order, as also shows from the Treaty, but the 
Court invokes the rule of law mostly to justify decisions related to legal remedies. That this 
rule of law often serves fundamental rights protection would not necessarily alter that 
conclusion: it does not mean that human rights are an inherent part of the rule of law. It 
means however clearly that the rule of law and fundamental rights are principles inextricably 
linked. Supporting and obvious evidence for an intertwined but separate legal and 
conceptual understanding of the rule of law and fundamental rights would also be the 
separate wording of the principles in the Treaty in Art. 6 TEU. I would thus agree with 
Arnull when he argues that such a rule of law notion for the Union enables conceptualising 
“a meaning which is distinct from, though complementary to, that of the other principles on 
which the Union is said to be founded”.50
However, applying the political and legal theory debate to the Union legal order also 
shows that this debate wields only limited relevance. Rather a more mixed and nuanced 
picture emerges in the EU where, as said before, the rule of law is increasingly connected to 
fundamental rights protection. The rule of law, although itself lacking clear justiciability,51 
is thus the “umbrella” principle from which different specifi c principles are derived that are 
connected with the assertion of the independent Union legal order as founded as a 
Rechtsgemeinschaft in which fundamental rights are protected.52 Additionally, as explained 
in the previous section, from the Treaty it becomes evident that the rule of law also evolved 
into a “politico-legal” benchmark for current and future Member States and that it 
increasingly became an overarching value in EU’s external relations. All these aspects are 
peculiar features of the rule of law in the EU. 
3.  Challenges for the rule of law in the EU: the external dimension of migration control
One may assume that after such solid case law by the Court and the explicit constitutional 
enshrinement of the principle, the rule of law is now in safe hands in the EU. That 
assumption may be further emboldened by the increased jurisdiction for the Court after the 
Lisbon Treaty; the court now has formal jurisdiction over a wider range of EU entities and 
policy fi elds.53 There is, however, reason to be cautious on this optimistic conclusion.
The policy fi eld of the external dimension of migration control provides an excellent 
case to put EU’s rhetorical commitment to the rule of law to the test. It is an area in which 
49 Ibid. 28.
50 Arnull, A.: The Rule of Law in the European Union. In: Arnull, A.–Wincott, D. (eds): 
Accountability and Legitimacy in the European Union. Oxford, 2002. 254.
51 Pech: The Rule of Law as a constitutional… op. cit. 9, 30, 46.
52 Esteban: op. cit. 175.
53 The Lisbon Treaty added to the institutions of the Union also the agencies and other bodies of 
the EU, see e.g. Art. 263 TFEU. Former third pillar dealing with Police and Judicial Cooperation in 
Criminal Matters (PJCC) is now also fi rm in the jurisdiction of the Court, albeit with a fi ve-year 
transitional period, see Art. 10, Protocol on transitional provisions. The Common Foreign and Security 
Policy (CFSP) still falls outside its jurisdiction. 
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internal and external aspects of the rule of law meet: it presents both an area where far-
reaching administrative actions are taken to limit irregular migration, thus calling for 
judicial review, and where the Union “goes abroad” to persuade third States to cooperate 
with its migration policy, thus calling for rule of law promotion. 
3.1. The External Dimension of EU’s Migration Control Policy
For those not familiar with the external dimension of migration control it may be good to 
outline in this section the main features of this policy fi eld. At the outset it should be noted 
that in the EU there exists no clearly circumscribed policy fi eld bearing the name “external 
dimension of EU migration control”. Also, there is no single EU entity dealing with this area. 
However, roughly speaking, this “external dimension” refers to all those policies to be 
implemented outside the EU (although often by or with the support of the EU) that aim to 
contribute to EU migration control. Cooperation with third State governments or 
international organisations is usually indispensable for this. Hence, it means that migration 
concerns have become part of EU’s wider external relations. 
With the 1992 Maastricht Treaty the foundations were laid for EU migration and 
asylum policy. It was not until 1999 that the European Council in Tampere called for greater 
coherence between internal and external policies of the Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) 
fi eld.54 In the subsequent years ever more attention was given to this important political aim 
of the EU. Cooperation of third States with EU’s migration control agenda is now regarded 
as crucial by EU policy makers.55
Nowadays, the main EU strategic document on the “external dimension” is the “Global 
Approach for Migration and Mobility” (GAMM, as recently the Commission proposed a 
renewed version) which is intended to address the external dimension of migration in a 
coherent way.56 Different approaches to the external dimension come together in this 
document: the “migration-development nexus”, the preventive “root causes” approach and 
restrictive migration control.57 The emerging core instrument for the “external dimension” 
seems to be the “Mobility Partnership” which includes components such as a readmission 
agreement, cooperation with Frontex (EU Border Agency), enhanced mobility for certain 
groups of third-country nationals and capacity-building programmes for foreign security 
services (such as border guards).58 However, also the implementation of EU visa policy by 
airlines on foreign airports can be considered part of the “external dimension”.59 The same 
54 European Council (1999), Conclusions of the Presidency, Tampere.
55 See e.g. European Council: The Stockholm Programme–An open and secure Europe serving 
and protecting citizens. OJ 2010, C 155/01, at 28.
56 See for the recently proposed changes: European Commission Communication: The global 
approach to migration and mobility, COM(2011) 743 fi nal. The original Global Approach was 
adopted in 2005.  
57 Ibid. 5–7.
58 See European Commission Staff Working Document: Mobility partnerships as a tool of the 
global approach to migration, SEC(2009) 1240. Mobility Partnerships have also been at the centre of 
EU’s response to the migration fl ows resulting from the Arab Spring: European Commission 
Communication: A dialogue for migration, mobility and security with the southern Mediterranean 
countries, COM(2011) 292 fi nal.
59 Gil-Bazo, M. T.: The Practice of Mediterranean States in the context of the European Union’s 
Justice and Home Affairs External Dimension. The Safe Third Country Concept Revisited. 
International Journal of Refugee Law, 18 (2006) 3–4, 573.
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goes for extraterritorial Frontex joint operations, also because they are often dependent on 
arrangements with third State governments or international organisations. 
Along with this greater attention for the “external dimension” came a body of academic 
literature addressing it from different disciplinary directions, most notably from political 
and legal scholarship. Concepts such as “externalisation”, “extra-territorialisation” or 
“remote border control” were developed to understand this new push in JHA policy-
making.60 Although the meanings of these concepts diverge, the red line running through 
them is the conclusion that the EU is pursuing ever more policies that aim to “shift the 
border outside”.61 This is done 1) by making external entities (e.g. third States, international 
organisations, private entities) responsible for elements of migration control or 2) by 
operating those controls outside EU territory. Some have understood this as an “effective” 
way to limit unwanted irregular migration while maintaining mobility for EU citizens and 
pre-authorised travellers.62 From legal scholarship several contributions have also identifi ed 
challenges resulting from these “externalisation” approaches to safeguarding human rights 
and the rule of law.63
3.2. Challenges for the Rule of Law
The scope of this article does not allow for an extensive overview of all the external 
dimension practices and all the possible challenges for the rule of law. However, a few 
elements of the external dimension are identifi ed to highlight the extent to which the rule of 
law is under pressure in these practices; most notably Frontex joint operations. Three such 
elements are presented: secret and unclear ways of working, lack of legal basis, lack of 
judicial remedies and the risk to external rule of law promotion.
Firstly, much of the external relations initiatives in this fi eld are shrouded in secrecy 
and fuzziness. Many of the working arrangements between EU governments or agencies 
(e.g. Frontex) and third State authorities are not publicly accessible. They are also not 
subject to the regular constitutional procedures for international treaty-making as foreseen 
in the Treaty, thus also excluding involvement of the European Parliament.64 Moreover, 
effective monitoring is lacking. For example, when joint operations of EU Agency Frontex 
60 See respectively Boswell, C.: The external dimension of EU migration and asylum policy. 
International Affairs, 79 (2003) 3, 622; Cremona, M.–Rijpma, J. J.: The extra-territorialisation of EU 
migration policies and the rule of law. EUI Working Paper, Law, (2007)1, 12; Guiraudon, V.: Before 
the EU border: remote control of the “huddled masses”. In: Groenendijk, K.–Guild, E.–Minderhoud, 
P. (eds): In Search of Europe’s Borders. The Hague, 2003, 194–195. 
61 See Lavenex, S.: Shifting up and out: The foreign policy of European immigration control. 
West European Politics, 29 (2006) 2, 330.
62 Guiraudon: op. cit. 194–195.
63 See e.g. Fischer-Lescano, A.–Löhr, T.–Tohidipur, T.: Border controls at sea: requirements 
under international human rights and refugee law. International Journal of Refugee Law, 21 (2009) 2, 
256–296; Den Heijer, M.: Europe beyond its borders: refugee and human rights protection in 
extraterritorial immigration control. In: Ryan, B.–Mitsilegas, V.: Extraterritorial immigration control. 
Leiden, 2010. 169–198; Weinzierl, R.–Lisson, U.:  Border management and human rights, a study of 
EU Law and the Law of the Sea. Berlin, 2007.
64 They are so-called “soft law” often under the name of “working arrangements” therefore not 
scrutinised by the European Parliament under Art. 218 TFEU.
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“go abroad” no independent monitors are entitled to join.65 It is therefore not always clear 
what is happening in these operations on the high seas or in the territories of third States. 
Within such joint operations it is often diffi cult to establish liability for actions. As many 
actors are usually involved (Frontex, Member States, international organisations and third 
State authorities) it is diffi cult to disentangle the web of actions.66 All these factors make it 
diffi cult for individuals to challenge decisions taken in the course of such operations. 
Because several human and refugee law rights are at stake, these decisions (for example, to 
return a boat with migrants without examination of individuals) may have serious 
repercussions for the lives of those targeted individuals. There are clear risks that individuals 
are returned to a country where his or her life is in danger, in contravention of the non-
refoulement principle. The secret and unclear ways of working make it however extremely 
diffi cult to establish liability and to build a case worth bringing to a European court.67
Secondly, for many of the practices in Frontex joint operations, such as interception at 
sea, there is no clear legal basis available in EU law or international law of the sea. Recently 
some efforts have been undertaken to provide such a legal basis in EU law.68 For activities 
on the high seas, the law of the sea applies, with its principles of freedom of the high seas 
and right of navigation for the fl ag State.69 This is not the place to discuss in detail the 
different justifi cations under maritime law to stop, search and divert boats in international 
waters, but those options are limited. “Search and rescue” or “absence of nationality”, 
sometimes invoked by Frontex,70 are indeed relevant grounds but cannot serve, in my 
opinion, a priori to justify a general and proactive policy of intercepting vessels even if 
65 During the negotiation of Frontex’ new mandate in 2011, some MEPs attempted to include a 
standard independent monitor system of its operations, this is however not included in the new text. 
This is why the Greens voted against the new Regulation in the EP, see The Greens/European Free 
Alliance in the European Parliament: Révision Frontex: des garanties insuffi santes pour le nouveau 
mandat de l’agence. Press Release, 12 July 2011.
66 Baldaccini, A.: Extraterritorial border controls in the EU: the role of Frontex in operations at 
sea. In: Ryan, B.–Mitsilegas, V. (eds): Extraterritorial immigration control: legal challenges. Leiden, 
2010. 230.
67 See also Mitsilegas, V.: Extraterritorial immigration control in the 21st century: the individual 
and the State transformed. In: Ryan, B.−Mitsilegas, V. (eds): Extraterritorial immigration control: 
legal challenges. Leiden, 2010. 39–68.
68 European Commission: Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the 
Council amending Regulation (EC) No. 562/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council 
establishing a Community Code on the rules governing the movement of persons across borders 
(Schengen Borders Code) and the Convention implementing the Schengen Agreement, COM(2011) 
118 fi nal, Annex IV. This proposal to allow for border checks in third countries is currently under 
review by the EP.
69 See Arts 87 and 90, UNCLOS (United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea).
70 Frontex Press Kit: Backgrounder on operations. 2010, 1: “Joint operations coordinated by 
Frontex represent Europe’s biggest search and rescue operation.”  Search and rescue is an obligation 
under international law; see mostly the SAR (Search and Rescue), UNCLOS (United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea) and the SOLAS (Safety of Life at Sea) Conventions. See also 
Council (2010). This Decision is however challenged before the CJEU by the EP on grounds of 
exceeding the implementing powers under Art. 12(5) SBC, see: Action brought on 14 July–European 
Parliament v Council of the European Union, Case C-355/10, OJ 2010, C246/58. The case is pending.
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they themselves do not indicate a state of distress.71 Neither they can serve to justify push-
back practices.72 Hence, the extra-territorial policy of Frontex JOs should be seriously 
scrutinised on grounds of a lacking adequate legal basis under EU an international law. This 
is not only hard to reconcile under “thick” but also under “thin” notions of the rule of law, 
such as the dominant formal legality notion.   
Thirdly, in many situations there is no remedy available for individuals targeted in the 
wider external dimension. “Extra-territorialising” migration control entails the inherent 
consequence that individuals have increasingly limited access to a European court, as they 
are simply not in Europe, to challenge decisions nevertheless taken, prepared or supported 
by European administrative authorities. It thus results in extending the “executive” reach of 
Europe beyond its territory, without accompanying it with a sound judicial framework. And 
even if migrants are under the control of European authorities, such as in Frontex joint 
operations on the high seas, there is often no remedy available to challenge the decisions 
taken by the border guards before they are being implemented. This is thus irrespective of 
that fact, as highlighted above, that these decisions may have serious human rights 
repercussions. In the recent Hirsi case the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) also 
clearly held that the right to an effective remedy under Art. 13 ECHR was violated by 
returning a boat of African migrants from the high seas to Libya.73 Hence, this core right 
fl owing from the rule of law is deemed to be under pressure in these operations. However, it 
should be seen in a wider context; by aiming to keep migrants as closely to their country of 
origin as possible the EU is also making it complicated for refugees to reach European 
territory and subsequently get their refugee status recognised in a fair and impartial case.
Lastly, these “externalisation” pushes by the EU increasingly jeopardise its self-
proclaimed image as a power that exports its core values, such as the rule of law. The 
academic “Normative Power Europe” thesis would arguably have a hard time explaining 
these external policies of the EU.74 The dominant restrictive pushes in the external 
dimension fi eld, such as the readmission agreements and Frontex joint operations, thus 
delegitimize the rhetoric from Brussels about human rights and the rule of law. Apart from 
the expected long-term international relations repercussions resulting from this, it is also 
hard to reconcile with the Treaties that so vehemently proclaim that the rule of law should 
guide external policies. 
This uncovers the diverging nature of the internal and external “functions” of the rule 
of law in the EU; respectively to constrain administrative action and to promote the 
principle externally. It is especially the constraint function of the rule of law that is easily 
71 Article 110 (1.d), UNCLOS authorizes the visiting of a ship on the basis of suspicion that the 
ship is without nationality. Art. 98 UNCLOS, and the above-mentioned additional conventions, lay 
down a “search and rescue” obligation. These articles can indeed be legal bases for intercepting a 
vessel. However, these legal bases must not become a justifi cation to stop any boat for which there is 
a “suspicion” that migrants are on board. Boarding without any of these legal bases available is thus 
problematic, although apparently vessels have been boarded without any clear distress situation, see 
Papastavridis, E.: “Fortress Europe” and Frontex: within or without international law? Nordic Journal 
of International Law, 79 (2010), 86, ftnt. 56. 
72 In the UNCLOS there is no legal basis for the coercive push-back of vessels to third States. 
73 ECtHR, Hirsi and others v. Italy, Application No. 27765/09, judgment of 23 February 2012. 
See especially paras 205–207. 
74 See Manners, I.: Normative Power Europe: a contradiction in terms? Journal of Common 
Market Studies, 40 (2002) 2, 235–258.
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disregarded in EU external relations, as it is assumed that third parties, and not the EU 
itself, should improve on its rule of law record. However, the extraterritorial migration 
control evidences how this assumption may sometimes be unfounded.
Conclusion
This section offers a brief overview of the main conclusions of this article and adds a few 
critical notes. As we have seen in this article, the rule of law has made a remarkable 
development in the EU. From the fi rst mention in Les Verts in 1986 it has now become a 
prominent constitutional cornerstone. Through the sometimes daring and dynamic case law 
of the Court it developed a strong emphasis on judicial protection to safeguard human rights 
in the EU. The Treaty has followed, albeit with delay, and now prominently features the rule 
of law as a foundational value of the EU, alongside other values such as fundamental rights 
and democracy. It is thus clear that in the EU the rule of law cannot be easily captured in the 
“all-or-nothing” theoretical dichotomy on “thin” versus “thick” notions of the principle. 
Instead, the principle is accorded idiosyncratic “procedural” features of judicial review but 
is nevertheless strongly connected with fundamental rights protection. Moreover, the 
constitutional text of the EU also holds the rule of law to be a “politico-legal benchmark” for 
current and future members and stresses the guiding role of the principle in external relations.
No matter how far the rule of law has indeed developed in the EU, the analysis in this 
article also uncovered persisting weaknesses. In the external dimension of migration control 
there are secret and unclear ways of working emerging that present serious threats to 
effectively upholding the rule of law. Moreover, the lack of judicial remedies accessible to 
individuals on the move who encounter “externalised” EU administrative actions and of 
inadequate legal basis for the carried out activities are at odds with basic rule of law 
requirements. In fact, problems in the EU with regard to legality, especially related to lack 
of adequate legal basis, may not be limited to the case study assessed in this article. It 
would hence be interesting for future academic contributions to examine whether peculiar 
features of EU governance prompt such problems. There may be a general trend in the EU, 
due to its specifi c sui generis nature, under which cooperation and initiatives are fi rst 
“experimented” and, if they are deemed successful, given a proper legal basis only later on. 
The analysis in this article has also highlighted the different functions of the rule of 
law internally and externally, respectively dealing with the constraint of administrative 
action and with the promotion of the principle abroad. These two functions are in an uneasy 
relationship in fi elds such as the external dimension of migration control where restrictive 
administrative action of EU authorities and promotion of the rule of law are sometimes 
diffi cult to reconcile.
So, with these identifi ed challenges, the development of the rule of law in the EU 
cannot be expected to have reached its fi nal stage. In fact it is well possible that the Court 
will further extend its jurisdiction to offer increasingly extensive judicial protection as new 
administrative strategies and ways of working feature in the European “executive” branch. 
Therefore, both from an academic and policy perspective the rule of law will expectedly 
remain an area of high interest. Although the substance of the principle, and especially its 
relation with fundamental rights, will remain an area of contestation for theorists, it seems 
that the development of the principle in any given polity will follow its idiosyncratic path 
resulting in different mixtures of and connections between “formal” and “substantive” 
elements. 
